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ABSTRACT
The federal government’s power to engage in
surveillance for national security purposes is extensive. In
an effort to reform the current national surveillance
regime, scholars have called for, among other things, the
creation of a “special advocate” to counter the
government’s arguments before the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. Feeling political pressure to improve
an ever-unpopular national surveillance regime,
lawmakers passed the USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom
Act”).
Section 401 of the Freedom Act provides for the
creation of an “amicus curiae,” a position that differs from
earlier conceptions of a “special advocate” in important
respects. This Essay examines those differences, and
counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus
curiae with a true special advocate. By doing so, this Essay
highlights the need for continued calls for a special
advocate.
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INTRODUCTION
As surveillance technologies continue to evolve, a lawyer’s
ability to employ both legal and technical skill has become an
increasingly important attribute. To properly represent her client
before a tribunal considering advanced surveillance technologies, a
lawyer must be capable of incorporating complex technological
issues into persuasive legal arguments. When it comes to many
national security issues, however, a lawyer rarely gets to make her
case. This is because many national security decisions are made
outside of a traditional adversarial setting. Often, only the
government’s argument is considered.
In an effort to reform the current national surveillance regime,
scholars have long called for the creation of a “special advocate.”1
While there have been various proposals, the general idea is that an
advocate would represent the interests of the public before the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)—the “secret”
court charged with overseeing government requests to collect data
for national security purposes.2 Presently, the FISC operates on an
1

See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA ‘Special Advocate’, 2
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing proposals). Throughout the
remainder of this Essay, “special advocate” will be used to refer to similarly
named proposals such as “public interest advocate” unless otherwise noted.
2
ANDRE NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, INTRODUCING A
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ex parte basis, meaning it grants or denies a government request to
collect data after considering the government’s argument.3
Inserting a special advocate into this process would allow the FISC
to hear arguments both for and against a given government request,
imitating the adversarial proceedings common in other American
courtrooms.
Arguments in favor of inserting someone to argue against a
government lawyer presenting her case before the FISC were
bolstered when it was revealed that the FISC had rarely denied a
government request.4 Feeling political pressure to do something to
improve an increasingly unpopular national surveillance regime,
Congress halfheartedly answered the calls for a special advocate
by passing the USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom Act”).5 This Essay
will focus on one specific aspect of the Freedom Act: the creation
of an “amicus curiae,” or “friend of the court” under Section 401.6
As this Essay will explain, the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae is
essentially a watered-down version of the type of special advocate
discussed above.
In Part I, this Essay will argue that the creation of a special
advocate is desirable. Part II will then examine the various ways in
which the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae falls short of providing the
PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT’S
COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2013).
3
Orin Kerr, A Rule of Lenity For National Security Law, 100 VA. L. REV.
1513, 1521–24 (2014).
4
Dina Temple-Raston, FISA Court Appears To Be Rubber Stamp For
Government Requests, NPR (June 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2013/06/13/191226106/fisa-court-appears-to-be-rubberstamp-for-governmentrequests.
5
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ23/PLAW114publ23.pdf; Frank Thorp V, Obama signs ‘USA Freedom Act’ to reform NSA
surveillance,
MSNBC
(June
2,
2015,
4:45
PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/senate-approves-usa-freedom-act-nsasurveillance. See Benjamin Wittes & Jodie Liu, So What’s in the New USA
Freedom Act, Anyway?, LAWFARE BLOG (May 14, 2015, 11:51 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/so-whats-new-usa-freedom-act-anyway
[hereinafter New USA Freedom Act], for a helpful analysis of the Freedom Act.
6
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268,
279–81.
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same benefits that a special advocate would provide. By doing so,
this Essay counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus
curiae with a true special advocate, and highlights the need for
continued calls for such an advocate.
I. THE BENEFIT OF A SPECIAL ADVOCATE
While some scholars have questioned the benefit of a special
advocate,7 this Essay, like others, adopts the position that such an
advocate is desirable.8 Part I will first provide a general
understanding of what a “true” special advocate would look like,
and will then argue why such an advocate would help improve the
current national security regime.
A. What Is a Special Advocate?
A 2013 Congressional Research Service Report generalized
some of the leading special advocate proposals as being “unified”
around the idea that the special advocate would have “a range of
responsibilities, such as being able to intervene in ongoing cases,
brief the FISC on relevant matters, conduct some forms of
discovery, file motions seeking discrete forms of relief from the
court . . . or even appeal an adverse ruling.”9 Similarly, one scholar
noted that “a common theme” of several proposals was “an
increase in the opportunities for adversarial litigation,” before both
the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review (“FISCR”), “to ensure that, even behind closed doors, the
government’s legal position is debated vigorously.”10
For the purposes of this Essay, a “true” special advocate is
therefore one that: (a) has the unencumbered right to participate in
at least some statutorily defined settings; (b) is properly equipped
to act as an equal counter-party to the government lawyer
presenting her case before the FISC; and (c) is afforded some
7

See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 3, at 1531–32 (arguing for the adoption of a
rule of lenity as an alternative to introducing adversarial mechanisms).
8
See Vladeck, supra note 1.
9
NOLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
10
Vladeck, supra note 1.
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ability to seek review by the FISCR.11 While the introduction of a
special advocate would not cure the current national security
regime of all its ills, Part I.B will address why the introduction of a
special advocate would be a step in the right direction.
B. Debate Is Helpful In An Otherwise Opaque Area of the Law
Because the FISC deals with on-going national security issues,
the inner workings of the court are largely kept “secret.”12 The
FISC was originally created following the Church Committee’s
findings of intelligence abuses in the 1970s.13 As one scholar
stated, “[t]he Executive Branch agreed to have many of its foreign
intelligence surveillance activities subjected to far greater legal
oversight and accountability, in exchange for which Congress and
the courts agreed to provide such oversight and accountability in
secret.”14 It is precisely because the FISC operates under a layer of
secrecy that a special advocate is desirable.
The secretive nature of national security law can result in an
“echo-chamber,” where similarly situated and isolated actors have
a reduced opportunity to have their presumptions and conclusions
tested by “outside” opinions.15 One recent example highlights this
point. The leaks by former government contractor Edward
Snowden revealed that the FISC was interpreting Section 215 of
the Patriot Act broadly, authorizing the government’s bulk
telephone metadata collection program.16 In the weeks leading up
11

See Letter from The Constitution Project to Speaker of the House et al. 4
(May
20,
2014),
available
at
http://justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/TCP-Letter-to-House-members-on-FISA-SpecialAdvocate-FINAL-SIGNED.pdf.
12
JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 584 (9th ed. 2015).
13
S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Foreign and Military Intelligence,
S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976).
14
Vladeck, supra note 1, at 2.
15
See Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National
Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 285
(2014).
16
Orin Kerr, Second Circuit rules, mostly symbolically, that current text of
Section 215 doesn’t authorize bulk surveillance, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/
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to Congress’s passage of the Freedom Act, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to a different conclusion,
holding that Section 215 of the Patriot Act did not authorize such a
widespread surveillance program.17
While the Second Circuit’s opinion represents just one
decision, it is revealing that two courts interpreting the same law
came to such drastically different outcomes, with the FISC
operating on an ex parte basis and the Second Circuit operating
within a traditional adversarial setting. One scholar went as far as
to say that it was not inconsistent for legislators to vote for the
Patriot Act in 2001, but against the telephone metadata program in
2015, because “the Patriot Act didn’t authorize bulk surveillance;
the FISC did, based on a major misreading of the Patriot Act.”18
One should be careful, however, with conflating such reasoning
with the notably different proposition that the federal judges who
serve on the FISC and FISCR are less able to interpret the law than
their colleagues who do not. The different interpretations of the
Patriot Act were not a result of a difference in the quality of the
judging, but rather the quality of the means available for the judges
to come to an informed decision.
Just as judges rely on the adversarial system to make an
informed decision in cases regarding complex securities or patents,
an adversarial setting can help ensure that judges on the FISC and
FISCR are properly informed about the constantly evolving
technologies associated with government surveillance. Judge
James G. Carr stated that during his “six years on the [FISC], there
were several occasions when I and other judges faced issues none
of us had encountered before,” concluding that “[h]aving lawyers
challenge novel legal assertions in [the FISC’s] secret proceedings
would result in better judicial outcomes.”19 It is for this reason that
07/second-circuit-rules-mostly-symbolically-that-current-text-of-section-215doesnt-authorize-bulk-surveillance/.
17
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015).
18
Orin Kerr, How much has Congress changed on surveillance?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/06/02/how-much-has-congress-changed-on-surveillance/.
19
James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html?_r=0.
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this Essay counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus
curiae with a special advocate. Introducing a special advocate into
FISC and FISCR proceedings can create the adversarial setting that
judges rely on in a way that an amicus curiae cannot. As Judge
Carr noted, appointing an amicus curiae “will not achieve true
reform, which requires appointment of an attorney.”20 While an
amicus curiae can help inform the court on important issues, Part II
will examine how the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae falls short of
providing the same informative benefits that an adversarial special
advocate could provide.
II. HOW THE AMICUS CURIAE FALLS SHORT
The amicus curiae provided for in Section 401 of the Freedom
Act is a far cry from the type of special advocate discussed in Part
I.21 While the Freedom Act should be celebrated for providing the
FISC and FISCR with the ability to learn from both technological
and legal experts acting as amicus curiae, it falls short in its ability
to allow such experts to meaningfully participate in the court’s
decision-making process. Part II aims to highlight the importance
of continued efforts to create a true special advocate by revealing
the limitations of the amicus curiae provided for in the Freedom
Act.22 Part II will first examine the ways in which the amicus
curiae can be prevented from playing any role before the FISC and
FISCR, let alone a minimal one. Second, the way in which the
Freedom Act curtails the amicus curiae’s ability to successfully
counter the government’s legal arguments will be addressed.
Lastly, the limits on the ability for the amicus curiae to seek
judicial review will be discussed.
20

James G. Carr, Fixing what ails the FISA, THE HILL (July 24, 2014, 11:00
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/213137-fixing-what-ailsthe-fisa.
21
See Steve Vladeck, The USA FREEDOM Act and a FISA “Special
Advocate”,
LAWFARE
BLOG
(May
20,
2014,
4:19
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/usa-freedom-act-and-fisa-special-advocate.
22
This assumes one is in favor of a special advocate at all. See Kerr, supra
note 3, for a discussion as to why the FISC should adopt a rule of lenity rather
than imitate the adversarial nature of a traditional lawmaking court.
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A. No Consistent Representation
The appointment procedures described in Section 401 of the
Freedom Act are split into two scenarios: one in which
appointment is mandatory, and one in which appointment is
optional. In the mandatory provision, Section 401 provides that the
FISC and FISCR
shall appoint an individual . . . to serve as amicus
curiae to assist such court in the consideration of
any application for an order or review that, in the
opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant
interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a
is
not
finding
that
such
appointment
appropriate . . . .23
Though the use of the word “shall” implies that the court must
appoint an amicus curiae in the described setting, two exceptions
are explicitly provided for in the above quoted statutory language
that allow for the court to opt out of appointing an amicus curiae.
The first exception to the mandatory appointment provision is
that the court can simply refuse to appoint an amicus curiae when
the court deems an appointment is not “appropriate.”24 Privacy
advocates at the Constitution Project highlighted this clause,
fearing that it would allow “FISC judges to sidestep [the
appointment] requirement simply by asserting that such an
appointment is unnecessary.”25 Of course, if the FISC did decide
that such an appointment would be inappropriate, the court is
required to issue a “finding” explaining that it has indeed found
so.26 It is unclear, however, what a “finding” entails in this context.
23

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(2)(A), 129
Stat. 268, 279.
24
Id.
25
Letter from The Constitution Project to Speaker of the House et al. 3
(May 20, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/05/TCP-Letter-to-House-members-on-FISA-Special-Advocate-FINALSIGNED.pdf.
26
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(2)(A), 129
Stat. 268, 279.
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If the court merely decides to state that it has concluded that an
appointment was inappropriate in the case at hand, then the finding
requirement will be of little practical value. If the court instead
takes the finding requirement as an opportunity to elucidate the
court’s internal decisions, doing so would be an admirable attempt
to bring transparency into an otherwise opaque area of the law.
Due to the secretive nature of the requests before the FISC and
FISCR, however, the finding requirement may not reveal much in
practice. In many of the scenarios in which the FISC or FISCR
might find it “appropriate” to opt out of the mandatory
appointment process, one can imagine that the court would decide
so as a result of the secretive nature of the underlying national
security information.27 If the FISC or FISCR opts out of appointing
an amicus curiae because of the secretive nature of the underlying
information, the court is unlikely to go into much detail in its
explanation—as doing so might defeat the purpose of opting out of
an appointment in the first place.
The second exception to the mandatory appointment provision
is that Section 401 of the Freedom Act explicitly states that it is a
matter of the court’s opinion to determine whether “any
application for an order or review . . . presents a novel or
significant interpretation of the law.”28 If the FISC or FISCR
determines that the case at hand does not present a novel or
significant issue, and the government refrains from objecting to the
court’s favorable decision, then the amicus curiae would play no
role at all in that particular proceeding.
An earlier draft of the Freedom Act proposed by Senator
Patrick Leahy included language to quell such fears, requiring a
broad mode of construction when determining what constitutes
“novel or significant” interpretations of the law.29 Senator Leahy’s
27

This scenario, however, should occur less frequently than one might
think. This is because Section 401 requires potential amicus curiae to “be
persons who are determined to be eligible for access to classified information
necessary to participate in matters before the courts.” Id.
28
Id.; Jodie Liu, So What Does the USA Freedom Act Do Anyway?,
LAWFARE BLOG (June 3, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sowhat-does-usa-freedom-act-do-anyway.
29
New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5.
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statutory language provided:
An application for an order or review shall be
considered to present a novel or significant
interpretation of the law if such application involves
application of settled law to novel technologies or
circumstances, or any other novel or significant
construction or interpretation of any provision of
law or of the Constitution of the United States,
including any novel and significant interpretation of
the term ‘specific selection term.’30
This language, however, was not adopted, providing the court with
the ability to more easily opt out of the mandatory appointment
provision.
The final version of Section 401 of the Freedom Act also
provides an optional appointment provision, granting the FISC and
FISCR the ability to appoint an amicus curiae “in any instance as
such court deems appropriate.”31 As is the case with the mandatory
appointment requirement, it will be interesting to see in what
settings the court deems it “appropriate” to appoint an amicus
curiae. After the Freedom Act takes effect, further research will be
necessary to reveal how often this optional appointment method is
deployed, and whether there is a correlation between the court’s
optional appointment of an amicus curiae and the court’s decision
to deny a government request.
B. Curtailment of Ability to Counter Legal Arguments
Unlike earlier proposals for a special advocate, the Freedom
Act’s amicus curiae is provided with substantially restricted access
to necessary information.32 While the Freedom Act provides that
the amicus curiae “shall have access to any legal precedent,
application, certification, petition, motion, or such other materials,”
30

S. 2685, 113th Cong.§ 401(i)(3) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy),
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf.
31
S. 2685, 113th Cong.§ 401(i)(2)(B) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy),
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf.
32
See New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5.
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access to at least some of those materials is limited to those “that
the court determines are relevant to the duties of the amicus
curiae.”33 Similarly, the amicus curiae “may have access to
classified documents, information, and other materials or
proceedings only if that individual is eligible for access to
classified information and to the extent consistent with the national
security of the United States.”34 In addition, Section 401 of the
Freedom Act explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to require the Government to provide information to
an amicus curiae appointed by the court that is privileged from
disclosure.”35
Compare the hedged access provided to the Freedom Act’s
amicus curiae to the language within Congressman Adam Schiff’s
proposed legislation that provided for a “public interest advocate”
with “access to all relevant evidence in such matter [for which the
advocate was appointed].”36 Congressman Schiff’s proposal also
provided the public interest advocate with the ability to “petition
the court to order the Federal Government to produce documents,
materials, or other evidence necessary to perform the duties of the
public interest advocate.”37 Similarly, a Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board report suggested that “[o]nce a Special Advocate
has been invited to participate with respect to an application or
other matter, the Special Advocate . . . should have access to all
government filings.”38
With restricted access to necessary information, the amicus
curiae could end up being little more than a shell of its intended
33

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(A)(i), 129
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added).
34
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(C), 129
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added).
35
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(6)(D), 129
Stat. 268, 280 (emphasis added).
36
H.R. 3159, 113th Cong., § 2(b)(i)(3)(C) (2013).
37
Id.
38
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT, 186 (2014), available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pclob215.pdf (emphasis added).
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purpose. Indeed, without the necessary information to develop an
informed opinion, the amicus curiae cannot even properly brief the
court, let alone provide an adversarial check against the
government. Withholding information from the amicus curiae
therefore represents one way in which the position is less useful
than even a traditional amicus curiae, let alone a special advocate.
Outside of the Freedom Act, a traditional amicus curiae would
typically have access to much of the preliminary briefing and other
docket materials in a given case. Because of the secretive nature of
the underlying information in a given proceeding before the FISC
or FISCR, however, the amicus curiae provided for in the Freedom
Act may not even have the ability to obtain those basic documents.
C. Limits on Judicial Review
The final aspect of the Freedom Act to be examined in this
Essay regards the amicus curiae’s reduced role in FISCR review of
FISC decisions.39 An earlier version of the Freedom Act required
the court to “designate a special advocate to serve as amicus curiae
to assist [the FISC or FISCR] in the consideration of any
certification pursuant to subsection (j).”40 The referred to
subsection (j) provided:
After issuing an order, [the FISC] shall certify for
review to the [FISCR] any question of law that the
[FISC] determines warrants such review because of
a need for uniformity or because consideration by
the [FISCR] would serve the interests of justice.
Upon certification of a question of law under this
paragraph, the [FISCR] may give binding
instructions or require the entire record to be sent up
for decision of the entire matter in controversy.41
39

See Liu, supra note 28; New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5.
S. 2685, 113th Cong., § 401(i)(2)(A) (2014) (as introduced by Sen.
Leahy),
available
at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
HEN14602.pdf.
41
S. 2685, 113th Cong., § 401(j) (2014) (as introduced by Sen. Leahy),
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN14602.pdf.
40
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While the final version of the Freedom Act provides for some
FISCR review of the FISC,42 it does not contain the provision
calling for the amicus curiae to assist in the FISC’s consideration
of whether certification to the FISCR is warranted.43 Suggesting
that such a change was more than a mere oversight, the final
version of the Freedom Act also provides for Supreme Court
review of the FISCR, but explicitly states that “[u]pon certification
. . . the Supreme Court of the United States may appoint an amicus
curiae . . . to provide briefing or other assistance.”44
Limiting the amicus curiae’s role in FISCR review restricts the
ability of the amicus curiae to influence the FISC’s legal
interpretations over the long term. The Freedom Act’s amicus
curiae is only appointed to provide “legal arguments” or
“information” when the court deems it “appropriate.”45 Compare
these duties with, for example, Congressman Schiff’s proposal,
which called on the public interest advocate to “participate fully in
the matter before the court for which such public interest advocate
was appointed with the same rights and privileges as the Federal
Government.”46
The discrete duties outlined in the Freedom Act, combined
with the requirement that the court designate “not fewer than [five]
individuals to be eligible to serve as amicus curiae,”47 results in
limiting the amicus curiae’s ability to influence the court to a
volatile series of one-off arguments. A special advocate, who could
participate in the FISC’s consideration of whether certification to
the FISCR is warranted, would have the opportunity to help shape
national security law over the long-term in instances where there is

42

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(j), 129 Stat.
268, 280–81.
43
See Liu, supra note 28; New USA Freedom Act, supra note 5.
44
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(k)(2), 129 Stat.
268, 281.
45
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(4)(A)–(B),
129 Stat. 268, 279.
46
H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(i)(3)(A) (1st Sess. 2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3159/text.
47
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(1), 129 Stat.
268, 279.
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“a need for uniformity.”48 Restricting the influence of the amicus
curiae to one-off arguments provided by a rotating cast of
designees falls short of accomplishing the same. As Judge Carr put
it, “[f]ailure to appoint counsel for the targets [of government
surveillance] will silence the advocate’s voice when it most must
be heard—on appeal. Enabling adversarial appellate review is
crucial to increased confidence in the FISC and its work.”49
Allowing a special advocate to play a role in determining whether
review is warranted would increase the likelihood that more than
one side of the issue is presented before the FISC interprets
important national security provisions, an opaque area of law
already lacking adversarial safeguards.50
CONCLUSION
The amicus curiae provided for in the final version of the
Freedom Act is a far cry from the “special advocate” that scholars
originally proposed. By addressing the various ways in which the
amicus curiae’s duties are restricted, this Essay has counseled
against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae with a true
special advocate. While the amicus curiae provided for in the
Freedom Act is a step in the right direction, continued calls for a
special advocate are warranted. National security issues often
involve the application of complex legal principles to novel
technologies. The type of special advocate argued for in this Essay
is better equipped to balance those overlapping legal and
technological concerns in a way that the Freedom Act’s amicus
curiae cannot.

48

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(j), 129 Stat.
268, 280–81.
49
Carr, supra note 20.
50
See Benkler, supra note 15, at 285 (referring to the “national security
system’s echo-chamber”).

